In the 1960s, perhaps influenced by his own memories of the war, Rawls sharply criticized the Vietnam War. In particular, it spoke against the 2-S carry-over. This change allowed students to avoid conscription to focus on their studies, but in practice it was abused to allow children from affluent backgrounds to avoid conscription. Rawls believed that this was not only unfair, but logically that a society would be less likely to be involved in unjust wars if the children of the political elite were on the front lines. In 1966, Rawls introduced a controversial resolution at Harvard faculty condemning the postponement. Other scholars, still committed to the liberal framework, have identified a new form of political process that emerged in the 1980s and 1990s. Whereas in the old political process, the ruling authorities chose certain people to present themselves to an opposition that the state wanted to eliminate, in the new political process, part of the public transforms the trial into a political process by identifying with the victims (who are not officially parties to the trial) or with the accused. In these cases, the state has no intention of initiating a political process and has very little control over its politicization (Fletcher, 1995). The people mobilized for these processes are usually external groups protesting their marginalization by legal and political institutions. Examples include famous rape trials and self-defense trials against abused women who killed their abusive spouses, where groups of women identified with the victim and politicized the process. The trial of Rodney King and the trial of O.J. Simpson also became political lawsuits in which African-American groups were mobilized to protest white justice in America. The review of these studies draws particular attention to the role of the media in these cases.
Security law is undergoing fundamental changes with the growing importance of human rights, international criminal law and transitional justice. These changes reflect the continuous adaptation and reformulation of legislation and instruments, as well as the development of new legislation. One example is the extension of the responsibility for the protection and prevention of States to individuals in cases of war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide. The rules of state responsibility are also changing, as is the state`s duty to protect its population and the basis for other actors to fulfill that duty if it fails to do so. The Latin American Model Protocol for the Study of Gender-Based Killings of Women is a practical tool for those responsible for investigating and prosecuting such acts. Its main objective is to offer guidelines and guidelines for improving the practice of people working in the justice system, forensic experts and other specialized people. Now let`s see how Mill applies his utilitarian theory to three problems of justice that are still relevant today. First, the question of punishment is one he considers in utilitarianism, although his discussion is aimed at considering alternative representations rather than conclusively saying what he himself thinks (we could also note that in this short passage he attacks social contract theory as useless fiction) (ibid., pp. 311-313).
As a utilitarian, it prefers the judicious use of penalties to deter criminal activity. He believes in the benefit/justice of self-defense and sees the right to punishment anchored in it. In 1868, as an elected member of Parliament, he gave a famous speech in the House of Commons in which he supported the death penalty for utilitarian reasons. While it is clear that he wants to be able to support a bill to abolish it, the legitimate order of society, a necessary condition for social welfare, requires this means to deter the most heinous crimes such as aggravated murder. He even thinks it`s a quicker and more humane punishment than locking someone behind bars for the rest of their lives. Mill worries about the possibility of executing an innocent person, but believes that a carefully managed legal system can make this danger “extremely rare” (“Punishment,” pp. 266-272). Thus, his utilitarian theory provides him with a basis for supporting the death penalty as morally justifiable. A second famous application of his utilitarian theory of justice, which Mill does, is the issue of equal opportunity for women. In the very first paragraph of The Subjection of Women, Mill asserts that “the principle governing existing social relations between the two sexes—the legal subordination of one sex to the other—is inherently false and now one of the principal obstacles to human improvement; and that it should be replaced by a principle of perfect equality that allows neither power nor privilege on the one hand, nor obstruction on the other. It therefore does not call for the preference of “positive action”, but only for equal opportunities. Unlike contemporary feminists, he does not invoke women`s human rights as justification, but only the maximization of “human happiness” and freedom “which makes life precious” (Subjection, pp.
1, 26, 101). Here, too, we are dealing with a question of social justice, to which his utilitarian theory is applied and which leads to liberal conclusions. Our third point of application concerns international non-intervention. Mill`s general principle here is that the use of force against others is prima facie unjust. While defensive wars may be justified, wars of aggression are not. It may be justified to go to war without being attacked or directly threatened with attack, for example, to civilize a barbaric society which, as such, supposedly has no rights. It may be justified to save a subjugated population from the oppression of a despotic government (“Non-Intervention”, pp. 376-383). All this is probably a function of utilitarian well-being. Once again, a moral question that is still relevant today has been addressed using the utilitarian theory of justice. This conference will examine the relationship between law, justice and uncertainty at present by focusing on two major questions: a) Is the international legal system adapting to bridge the “security gap” and how effectively? (b) What is the role of new legal instruments such as international justice and transitional justice in relation to the “security gap”? However, different researchers explain the concept of social justice in different ways.
Some believe that social justice is about giving each individual their rightful share in the social sphere. According to others, the distribution of social institutions and rights on the basis of law and justice constitutes social justice. Rawls develops more carefully his articulation of these two principles of justice. He reframes the first in terms of maximum equal liberty, writing that “every person has an equal right to the most extensive fundamental liberty compatible with a similar freedom for others.” The fundamental freedoms referred to relate to the civil rights protected by our Constitution – freedom of expression, freedom of assembly, freedom of conscience, the right to private property, the right to vote and hold public office, the right not to be arbitrarily arrested and confiscated, etc. The lexical priority of this first principle requires that it be categorical, since the only justification for restricting fundamental freedoms is to strengthen other fundamental freedoms; For example, it could only be a matter of restricting the free access of the press to a sensational trial in order to protect the right of the accused to a fair trial. Rawls reiterates his second principle to assert that “social and economic inequalities must be arranged in such a way that they are both (a) reasonably beneficial to all and (b) related to positions and positions open to all.” In this way, socio-economic inequalities can be justified, but only if both conditions are met. The first condition (a) is the “principle of difference” and takes seriously the idea that any socio-economic difference that separates one member of society from others must be beneficial to all, including the lowest ranked person. The second condition is “equitable equality”, in which socio-economic benefits must be linked to positions to which all members of society can have access. For example, the office of president has given him more social status and income than most of us have at our disposal. Is that fair? Presumably, all of us as citizens could achieve this function with its remuneration, and that even those of us who are at or near the socio-economic ladder benefit from intelligent and talented people who take on the great responsibilities of this function.
Just as the first principle must lexically take precedence over the second, Rawls also asserts that “fair odds take precedence over the principle of difference.” Thus, if we have to choose between equal opportunities for all and the “most disadvantaged” socio-economic members of society, the former takes precedence over the latter.